Separation of Duties (SoD) aims at preventing fraud and errors by distributing tasks and associated authorizations among multiple users. Li and Wang [2008] proposed an algebra (SoDA) for specifying SoD requirements, which is both expressive in the requirements it formalizes and abstract in that it is not bound to a workflow model. In this article, we bridge the gap between the specification of SoD constraints modeled in SoDA and their enforcement in a dynamic, service-oriented enterprise environment. We proceed by generalizing SoDA's semantics to traces, modeling workflow executions that satisfy the respective SoDA terms. We then refine the set of traces induced by a SoDA term to also account for a workflow's control-flow and role-based authorizations. Our formalization, which is based on the process algebra CSP, supports the enforcement of SoD on general workflows and handles changing role assignments during workflow execution, addressing a well-known source of fraud.
INTRODUCTION
Most information-security mechanisms aim at protecting resources from external threats. However, threats often reside within organizations where authorized system
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Existing specification formalisms and enforcement mechanisms for SoD are limited in the kinds of constraints they can handle. Moreover, they are typically bound to specific workflow models. The SoD algebra (SoDA) [Li and Wang 2008 ] constitutes a notable exception. It allows the modeling of SoD constraints at a high level of abstraction, combining quantification and qualification requirements. As an example, consider the SoD policy that requires the involvement of a user other than Bob that acts in the role of a Manager and one or two additional users, acting as an Accountant and a Clerk. Using SoDA, this policy can be modeled by the term (Manager ¬{Bob}) ⊗ (Accountant Clerk) .
The term's left side is satisfied by any Manager other than Bob. Under the semantics of the -operator, the right side is satisfied by a single user that acts as an Accountant and a Clerk or by two users, provided one of them acts as an Accountant and the other as a Clerk. Finally, the ⊗-operator requires that the users in the two parts are disjoint. It thereby separates their duties. As this example shows, SoDA terms specify both the number and kinds of users who must take part in a business process, independent of the details of the process itself. However, even though such policies are abstract, they are enforced on concrete business processes. Hence, we require a mapping between SoDA and an enforcement mechanism that constrains concrete processes.
In this article, we bridge the gap between the abstract specification of SoD constraints, formalized using SoDA, and an architecture for their enforcement in a dynamic enterprise environment. We proceed by formalizing workflows that model business processes, role-based static authorizations, SoD constraints, and combine them to model an SoD-secure workflow system. We specify these models using the process algebra CSP [Roscoe 1997 ], whose trace-based model is a natural fit for describing workflow executions and whose notion of process synchronization allows us to decompose the system into loosely coupled components. However, our results are not CSP-specific and may as well be described using other formalisms.
Our CSP model serves as blueprint for a proof-of-concept implementation. We provision the SoD enforcement functionality as an instance of the software delivery model Software as a Service (SaaS) [Turner et al. 2003 ], which we call SoD as a Service. We show analytically that our approach has an acceptable runtime performance for the workflows used in practice even though deciding the satisfiability of a workflow instance with respect to our CSP model is NP-complete in general. We support this analysis with performance measurements from an extensive and realistic case study. In addition, our case study demonstrates the feasibility of SoD as a Service and pinpoints critical design decisions.
Along the way from abstract specification to enforcement, we tackle the following challenges.
(1) Generalization of SoDA's semantics. Due to SoDA's abstract nature, design decisions arise when mapping SoDA terms onto workflow instances. In particular, a link between the satisfaction of terms and the tasks executed in workflow instances is missing. We provide a solution to this problem by generalizing Li and Wang's [2008] set-based semantics first to a multiset semantics and second to a trace-based semantics. A correctness proof for the CSP model of the SoD enforcement component establishes that every SoD-constrained workflow instance that successfully terminates satisfies the respective SoDA term with respect to our trace semantics.
(2) Flexible integration. New technologies and methodologies, such as ServiceOriented Architectures (SOAs), facilitate the extension of legacy information systems with new functionality. We build on these advances with the idea of SoD as a Service and thereby achieve a loose coupling between a workflow engine that executes the business logic, a user repository that administers users and their authorizations, and the enforcement of abstract SoD constraints. In exchange for a moderate increase in communication, our architecture separates concerns and reduces implementation and configuration costs. At the same time, changing legal requirements and organizational changes can quickly be reflected in the IT infrastructure.
(3) Changing authorizations. Previous work on SoD enforcement makes the assumption that authorizations do not change during workflow execution. However, organizational changes, triggered by acquisitions, promotions, and job cuts, are among the major sources of fraud [Ernest and Young 2009] . By incorporating administrative events, which model authorization changes, in our trace-based SoDA semantics we overcome this limitation. Our formal models and implementation are therefore well-suited to handle the dynamics of today's fast-paced business environments.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on CSP and multisets. In Section 3, we formalize workflows, role-based authorizations, and their composition. Furthermore, we introduce our case study. We then define in Section 4 SoDA's syntax and generalize its semantics to multisets and traces. Based on our CSP models, we implement in Section 5 SoD as a Service in an industrial workflow environment and present performance measurements for our case study. We evaluate our approach and identify future work in Section 6, present related work in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8. The Appendix provides proofs and summarizes Li and Wang's [2008] original SoDA semantics. Overall, this article combines and extends results from our previous papers [Basin et al. 2009 [Basin et al. , 2011a ]. An extended version of this article is available as the technical report [Basin et al. 2011c ].
BACKGROUND

CSP
We use a subset of Hoare's process algebra CSP [Roscoe 1997 ] to formalize the enforcement of authorization constraints on workflows. CSP describes a system as a set of communicating processes that concurrently engage in events.
denotes the set of all regular events. In addition, we use the special event that communicates successful termination. Let D ⊆ . We write D for D ∪ { }. Events can be structured as tuples. For example, z 1 .z 2 . . . . .z n denotes the event that corresponds to the tuple (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) ∈ Z 1 × Z 2 × · · · × Z n , for sets Z 1 , Z 2 , . . . , Z n and n ≥ 1.
A trace, denoted σ 1 , . . . , σ n , is a sequence of events, possibly ending with the special event . denotes the empty trace and i 1ˆi2 the concatenation of two traces i 1 and i 2 . Moreover, D * denotes the set of all finite traces over the set of events D and its superset D * = D * ∪ {iˆ | i ∈ D * } also includes the traces ending with . We abuse the set membership operator ∈ and write σ ∈ i for an event σ and a trace i if there exist two traces i 1 and i 2 such that i = i 1ˆ σ ˆi 2 . For a trace i and D ⊆ , i D denotes i restricted to the events in D. Formally,
13:4 D. Basin et al. Let N be the set of process names and n ∈ N . The set of processes P is inductively defined by the grammar
where σ ∈ . The assignment of a process P to n is denoted by n = P and can be parametrized. For example n(z) = P defines a process parametrized by the variable z.
There are different approaches to formally describing the behavior of a process. In this article, we use CSP's traces model T that describes a process P as a prefix-closed set of finite traces T(P) ⊆ * . We say P accepts i if i ∈ T(P). In the following, let P, P 1 , and P 2 be processes. The process σ → P engages in the event σ first and behaves like P afterward. Formally, T(σ → P) = { }∪{ σ ˆi | i ∈ T(P)}. This notation can be extended. For D ⊆ , the process σ : D → P engages in every σ ∈ D and afterwards behaves like P. The process SKIP engages in the special event and terminates afterwards, formally T(SKIP) = { , }. The process STOP does not engage in any event and therefore represents deadlock, that is, T(STOP) = { }. For an assignment n = P, the process n behaves like P. The process P 1 P 2 denotes the external choice between P 1 and P 2 in that the environment can choose whether the process behaves like P 1 or P 2 . Similarly, P 1 P 2 denotes the internal choice between P 1 and P 2 in that the process can decide whether it behaves like P 1 or P 2 . In terms of the traces model, P 1 P 2 and P 1 P 2 are indistinguishable, namely T(P 1 P 2 ) = T(P 1 P 2 ) = T(P 1 ) ∪ T(P 2 ). The process P 1 D P 2 represents the parallel composition of P 1 and P 2 synchronized on D ⊆ . This means, P 1 D P 2 engages in an event σ 1 ∈ D if P 1 and P 2 synchronously engage in σ 1 and P 1 D P 2 engages in an event σ 2 ∈ D if either P 1 or P 2 engages in σ 2 . The special event is always implicitly contained in the set of synchronization events D, that is, P 1 D P 2 can only successfully terminate if both P 1 and P 2 can successfully terminate. We omit a formal definition the synchronization operator's semantics as it requires a large case distinction and therefore considerable space. The definition can be found in Roscoe [1997] . P 1 P 2 is an alternative notation for the fully synchronized parallel composition P 1 P 2 . Similarly, P 1 ||| P 2 denotes to the unsynchronized parallel composition of P 1 and P 2 , that is, P 1 ∅ P 2 . The process P 1 ; P 2 denotes the sequential composition of P 1 and P 2 . It first behaves like P 1 . Upon successful termination of P 1 , the event is hidden. Afterwards, the process behaves like P 2 . Formally,
Multisets
We make extensive use of multisets. A multiset, or bag, is a collection of objects where repetition is allowed [Syropoulos 2000] . Formally, given a set Z, a multiset Z of Z is a pair (Z, f ), where the function f : Z → N 0 defines how often each element z ∈ Z occurs in Z. We write Z(z) as shorthand for f (z). We say that z is an element of Z, written z ∈ Z, if Z(z) ≥ 1. We use double curly-brackets to define multisets, for example, Z = {{z 1 , z 1 }} is the multiset where Z(z 1 ) = 2 and Z(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z \ {z 1 }. For a finite multiset Z, |Z| denotes its cardinality and is defined as z∈Z Z(z). Let Z 1 and Z 2 be two multisets of Z. Their intersection, denoted Z 1 ∩ Z 2 , is the multiset Z, where for all z ∈ Z, Z(z) = min(Z 1 (z), Z 2 (z)). Similarly, their union, denoted Z 1 ∪ Z 2 , is the multiset Z, where for all z ∈ Z, Z(z) = max(Z 1 (z), Z 2 (z)), and their sum, denoted Z 1 Z 2 , is the multiset Z, where for all z ∈ Z, Z(z) = Z 1 (z) + Z 2 (z). The empty multiset ∅ ∅ ∅ of Z is the multiset where ∅ ∅ ∅(z) = 0, for all z ∈ Z.
We call a unit of work a task. Because SoD constraints are concerned with human activities, we concentrate on tasks that are executed by humans, either directly, for example by filling in a form, or indirectly, for example by executing a program on their behalf. A workflow models the causal dependencies between a set of tasks, which together implement a business objective. An alternative name for workflow is business process, although we stick in this article to the term workflow. At design time, a workflow is specified using a workflow modeling language. At runtime it is executed by a workflow engine. We call an execution of a workflow a workflow instance. A workflow engine may execute multiple instances of the same workflow in parallel. The execution of a task in a workflow instance is called a task instance. Standard workflow modeling languages, such as the one we use in Section 3.3, allow the specification of loops, parallel, and conditional execution. Hence there can be zero or more instances of the same task in one workflow instance.
Workflow Formalization
For the rest of this article, let U be a set of users and T a set of tasks. For a task t ∈ T and a user u ∈ U, we call an event of the form t.u a (task) execution event and denote by X = {t.u | t ∈ T , u ∈ U} the set of all execution events. An execution event t.u models the execution of the task t by the user u, that is, a task instance together with its associated user.
We now formalize workflows using CSP as follows.
Let a workflow process W be given. We call a trace i ∈ * a workflow trace of W, if (i X ) ∈ T(W). A workflow trace i models a workflow instance. For now we focus on workflow traces composed of execution events. However, we will subsequently introduce administrative events that model complementary activities taking place during workflow execution. In order to be a workflow trace of W, only the execution events in i must be a trace of W; hence the restriction i X . We say the workflow instance modeled by i has successfully terminated if ∈ i.
Given a trace i, the auxiliary function users returns the multiset of users contained in execution events in i.
Composing Workflows and Access Control
We describe authorized task executions in terms of a process A. Given a workflow process W, we then describe the enforcement of the authorization constraints described by A by executing A in parallel with W, synchronized on X , formally W X A.
We use Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [Ferraiolo et al. 2001] for specifying workflow-independent authorizations and only make use of RBAC's core feature, the decomposition of the user permission assignment into a user role and a role permission assignment. For the reminder of this article, let R be a set of roles.
Definition 3.2. An RBAC configuration is a tuple (UA, PA), where UA ⊆ U × R is a user assignment relation and PA ⊆ R × T is a permission assignment relation.
In this article, a permission corresponds to the right to execute a task. We therefore assign roles directly to tasks. Assume an RBAC configuration (UA, PA) and a user u.
For a role r, we say that u acts in the role r if (u, r) ∈ UA. Furthermore, for a task t we say that u is authorized to execute t with respect to (UA, PA) if there is a role r such that (u, r) ∈ UA and (r, t) ∈ PA.
In contrast to the NIST RBAC standard [Ferraiolo et al. 2001] , we omit the concept of sessions. This is without loss of generality as the activation and deactivation of roles within a session can be modeled by changing RBAC configurations as discussed shortly. We also omit role hierarchies because an RBAC configuration including a role hierarchy can be transformed into an equivalent RBAC configuration without a hierarchy by flattening the hierarchy by adding additional tuples to the permission assignment relation.
We model changes to the RBAC configuration by a set of events A ⊆ that we call the administrative events. For a user u and a role r, the administrative event add.u.r (respectively, rm.u.r) models the addition (respectively, the removal) of (u, r) from the user assignment relation. We do not consider administrative events that change permission assignment relations. This design decision is due to the observation that user role assignments and the availability of users in general change much more frequently in practice than workflow and role models.
We now specify the evolution of an RBAC configuration and authorized task executions as a process.
Definition 3.3. For an RBAC configuration (UA, PA), we call the process
An RBAC process is parametrized by an RBAC configuration (UA, PA) and engages in every execution event t.u if u is authorized to execute t with respect to (UA, PA). Furthermore, an RBAC process changes its user assignment relation by engaging in administrative events and may terminate at any time. We now compose a workflow process with an RBAC process. (UA, PA) . By synchronizing only on execution events, arbitrary administrative events can be interleaved with execution events in any order. Thus, the RBAC configuration can change during a workflow's execution.
Having introduced all the kinds of events that we need, specifically, = X ∪ A, we now introduce the case study that accompanies this article.
Case Study
We illustrate the notions introduced before with a drug dispensation workflow from Marino et al. [2009] . This workflow defines the tasks that must be executed to dispense drugs to patients within a hospital. The drugs dispensed are either in an experimental stage or are very expensive and therefore require special diligence. Figure 1 shows a visualization of the drug dispensation workflow in the Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) [OMG 2011 ]. For our case study, let T = {t 1 , . . . , t 10 }, where t 1 refers to Request Drugs, t 2 to Retrieve Patient Record, etc., as illustrated in Figure 1 . The set of users U and the set of roles R are shown in Figure 2 . Let (UA 1 , PA) be the initial RBAC configuration of our case study. The user assignment relation UA 1 is depicted in Figure 2 , ignoring the dashed and dotted lines between users and roles, for example, (Alice, Therapist) ∈ UA 1 and (Alice, Pharmacist) ∈ UA 1 . The permission assignment relation PA is illustrated in Figure 1 by means of BPMN annotations. For example, only users acting in the role Nurse are authorized to execute t 2 with respect to (UA 1 , PA). We assigned only one role to each task but in general tasks can be annotated with sets of roles.
An instance of the drug dispensation workflow is started by a Patient who requests drugs by handing his prescription to a Nurse. The Nurse retrieves the patient's record from the hospital's database and forwards all data to a PrivacyAdvocate who checks whether the patient's data must be anonymized. If anonymization is required, this is done by a computer program. We ignore this task in our forthcoming discussion as we focus on human tasks. If therapeutic notes are contained in the prescription, they are reviewed by a Therapist. In parallel, research-related data is added by a Researcher if the requested drugs are in an experimental stage. Finally, a Pharmacist either approves the dispensation and a Nurse collects the drugs from the stock and gives them to the patient, or he denies the dispensation and a Nurse informs the Patient accordingly.
We model the drug dispensation workflow in CSP as the following workflow process.
Because we do not model data-flow, we overapproximate gateway decisions, such as whether therapeutical notes must be reviewed, with CSP's internal-choice operator . Let SP W (UA 1 , PA) be the secure process for W and (UA 1 , PA). 
Because Fritz is authorized to execute t 3 with respect to (UA 2 , PA), i 2 is a trace of SP W (UA 1 , PA). With respect to execution events, i 2 is equal to i 1 , that is, i 2 X = i 1 X , and therefore i 2 is also a workflow trace of W.
GENERALIZING ABSTRACT SEPARATION OF DUTY CONSTRAINTS TO TRACES
SoDA Syntax
Our work builds on Li and Wang's Separation of Duty Algebra (SoDA) [2008] . We present next the syntax of SoDA terms. Definition 4.1. A SoDA grammar S with respect to a set of users U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and a set of roles R = {r 1 , . . . , r m } is a quadruple (N, T , P, S) where:
* ) is given by:
-and S ∈ N is the start symbol.
The terminal symbols ⊗, , , , + , and ¬ are also called operators. Without loss of generality, we omit the productions CT ::= (S CT ) and CT ::= (S CT ). Li and Wang showed in [2008] that and are commutative with respect to their semantics and this is also the case for our semantics. Therefore, each term that could be constructed with these additional productions can be transformed to a semantically equivalent term constructed without them.
Let an element of {s ∈ T * | AT → * S s} an atomic term. These are either a nonempty set of users, for example, {Alice, Bob}, a single role, for example, Clerk, or the keyword All. We call an element of {s ∈ T * | U T → * S s} a unit term. These terms do not contain the operators ⊗, , and + . Finally, a complex term is an element of {s ∈ T * | CT → * S s}. In contrast to unit terms, they contain at least one of the operators ⊗, , or + . For a term φ, we call a unit term φ ut a maximal unit term of φ if φ ut is a unit term, a subterm of φ, and if there is no other unit term φ ut that is also a subterm of φ and φ ut is a proper subterm of φ ut .
SoDA Multiset Semantics
Li and Wang define the satisfaction of SoDA terms for sets of users [2008] . We refer to their semantics as SODA S . It allows for quantitative constraints where terms define how many different users must execute tasks in a workflow instance. However, SODA S does not express how many tasks each of these users must execute. Consider the policy P that requires Bob to execute two tasks, modeled by the SoDA term φ = {Bob} {Bob}. Under SODA S , φ is satisfied by the set {Bob}. There is no satisfactory mapping of φ to a process that accepts all traces that correspond to satisfying assignments of φ. If we define the correspondence between sets and traces in a way that {Bob} maps to the set of traces containing exactly one execution event involving Bob, this would not satisfy P. Alternatively, if we map {Bob} to the set of traces containing arbitrarily many execution events involving Bob, this set would also include traces that do not satisfy P, for example, the trace containing three execution events involving Bob. The problem is that sets of users are too abstract: users cannot be repeated and hence information is lost on how many tasks a user (here Bob) must execute.
To address this problem, we introduce a new semantics, SODA M , that defines term satisfaction based on multisets of users. SODA M allows us to make finer distinctions concerning repetition (quantification requirements) than in SODA S . As shown shortly, φ is only satisfied under SODA M by the multiset {{Bob, Bob}}. Mapping multisets to traces is straightforward. For example, traces corresponding to {{Bob, Bob}} have exactly two execution events involving Bob. In this respect, SODA M allows a more precise mapping to traces than SODA S .
Definition 4.2. Let U ⊆ U be a nonempty set of users and r ∈ R a role. For a multiset of users U, a term φ, and a user assignment relation UA, multiset satisfiability is the smallest ternary relation between multisets of users, user assignment relations, and terms, written U |= M UA φ, that is closed under the rules
We say that U satisfies φ with respect to UA if U |= M UA φ. Informally, a user u satisfies the term All if u is in the domain of UA. A user u satisfies a role r if there is a role assignment (u, r) in UA, and u satisfies a set of users U if u is member of U and is in the domain of UA. A unit term ¬φ is satisfied by u if u does not satisfy φ. A nonempty multiset of users U satisfies a complex term φ + if each user u ∈ U satisfies the unit term φ. A multiset of users U satisfies a term φ ψ if U satisfies either φ or ψ, and U satisfies a term φ ψ if U satisfies both φ and ψ. A term φ ⊗ ψ is satisfied by a multiset of users W, if W can be partitioned into two disjoint multisets U and V, and U satisfies φ and V satisfies ψ. Because every user in W must be in either U or V, but not both, the ⊗ operator separates duties between two multisets of users. In contrast, a term φ ψ is satisfied by a multiset of users W, if there are two multisets U and V, which may share users, and U satisfies φ, V satisfies ψ, and W is the sum of U and V. Thus, the operator allows "overlapping" duties where a user is in both U and V.
With SODA M the significance of maximal unit terms becomes evident. If a multiset of users U satisfies a term φ, every user in U corresponds to at least one maximal unit term in φ. We associate in the following a user u ∈ U with the execution of a task by u, that is, an execution event t.u, for an arbitrary task t. When mapping terms to processes, the satisfaction of a maximal unit term will therefore correspond to engaging in an execution event.
We now provide two examples of SoDA terms. The first serves as the SoD policy for our case study and the second illustrates the difference between SODA M and SODA S .
Example 4.3. Fraudulent or erroneous drug dispensations may jeopardize a patients' health, may violate regulations, and could severely impact the hospital's finances and reputation. We therefore assume that a hospital who executes the drug dispensation workflow enforces SoD constraints to reduce these risks. Concretely, a Pharmacist may not dispense drugs to himself; that is, he should not act as a Patient and a Pharmacist within the same workflow instance. Similarly, the Nurse who prepares the drugs should not be the same user as the Pharmacist who approves the dispensation. Furthermore, the PrivacyAdvocate must be different from any other user involved in the same workflow instance. Finally, the nurse Claire may not be involved in the dispensation due to her drug abuse history. However, as a Patient she may receive drugs. All these constraints are encoded by the term φ = Patient ⊗ ( (¬{Claire})
. Consider now the user assignment relation UA 3 shown in Figure 2 . The multiset U 1 = {{Alice, Bob, Dave, Emma, Fritz, Gerda, Gerda}} satisfies φ with respect to UA 3 . However, U 2 = {{Bob, Emma, Fritz, Gerda, Gerda}} does not satisfy φ with respect to UA 3 because φ requires at least one user acting as Pharmacist and U 2 contains no user who acts as Pharmacist with respect to UA 3 . (U,UR) φ denotes the satisfaction of a term φ by a set of users X ⊆ U with respect to a tuple (U, UR), where U ⊆ U and UR ⊆ U × R. Because tasks can only be executed by users who are assigned to at least one role, we simplify this tuple and extract the available users from UA, as can be seen in Rule (3) of Definition 4.2. For a user assignment relation UA, the function lwconf(UA) = (dom(UA), UA) maps UA to the corresponding tuple in SODA S . Moreover, given a multiset of users U, the function userset(U) = {u | u ∈ U} returns the set of users contained in U. 
Enforcement Approach and Requirements
As shown previously, SoDA specifies SoD constraints at a high level of abstraction. However, the enforcement takes place at runtime in the context of a workflow instance. Given a term φ, we now describe how to construct an enforcement monitor for φ. Our construction maps φ to a process SOD φ (UA), called the SoD enforcement process, parametrized by a user assignment relation UA. SOD φ (UA) accepts all traces corresponding to a multiset that satisfies φ with respect to UA. We show later in Section 5 how to implement SOD φ (UA) as a service and how to provision and integrate this service in an enterprise environment.
In practice, it is critical to allow administrative events during workflow execution. If Bob leaves his company, it should be possible to remove all his role assignments, thereby preventing him from subsequently executing tasks. Similarly, if Alice joins a company or changes positions, and is therefore assigned new roles, she should also be able to execute tasks in workflow instances that were started prior to the organizational change. Assuming that a user assignment relation does not change during the execution of a workflow instance is therefore overly restrictive. The SoD enforcement process defined next accounts for such changes. The function upd ("update") describes how a trace of administrative events changes a user assignment relation. Definition 4.6. Let a ∈ A * be a trace of administrative events and UA a user assignment relation. The function upd is then defined as
where u ranges over U, r over R, and a over A * .
Let φ be a term, UA a user assignment relation, and SOD φ (UA) the SoD enforcement process for φ and UA. We postulate the following requirements for SOD φ (UA). UA φ, then each user in U satisfies at least one maximal unit term of φ with respect to UA. Similarly, SOD φ (UA) must not engage in an execution event if the corresponding user does not contribute to the satisfaction of φ. As for (R3), consider for example the terms φ ⊗ ψ and φ ψ. It must be possible to partition a trace satisfying φ ⊗ ψ or φ ψ into two subtraces, one satisfying φ and the other one satisfying ψ. In the case of φ ⊗ ψ, the users who execute task instances in one trace must be disjoint from the users executing task instances in the other trace. In contrast, for φ ψ, the multisets of users need not be disjoint. In particular, (R3) states that if SOD φ (UA) accepts a trace i that contains no administrative event and reaches a final state, then users(i) |= M UA φ.
SoDA Trace Semantics
The following example shows that SODA M is not expressive enough to capture the requirements (R1)-(R3).
Example 4.7. Suppose that SODA M were expressive enough to capture (R1)-(R3). Consider the policy P that requires one task to be executed by a user acting as a Pharmacist and another task to be executed by a user who is not acting as a Pharmacist. We model P by the term φ = Pharmacist ¬Pharmacist and consider the trace i = add.Alice.Pharmacist, t 1 .Alice, rm.Alice.Pharmacist, t 2 .Alice , for two arbitrary tasks t 1 and t 2 . From (R1)-(R3), it follows that SOD φ (∅) must accept i. By (R1), SOD φ (∅) engages in add.Alice.Pharmacist and afterwards behaves like SOD φ (UA), for UA = {(Alice, Pharmacist)}. Next, SOD φ (UA) engages in t 1 .Alice by (R2) and (R3) because Alice acts as a Pharmacist. Again by (R1), SOD φ (UA) engages in rm.Alice.Pharmacist and afterwards behaves like SOD φ (∅). Finally, by (R2) and (R3), SOD φ (∅) engages in t 2 .Alice because Alice does not act as a Pharmacist. In the end, SOD φ engaged in an execution event with a user that acted as a Pharmacist and in another execution event with a user not acting as a Pharmacist, satisfying the policy P. Because of the administrative events it was possible that both tasks were executed by the same user, that is, users(i) = {{Alice, Alice}}. However, under SODA M , φ can only be satisfied by a multiset of users that contains two different users, which contradicts users(i) = {{Alice, Alice}}. Hence, SODA M is not expressive enough to capture (R1)-(R3).
The inability to handle administrative changes motivates the introduction of a third semantics, SODA T . In SODA T , subterms correspond to separate traces that may interleave with each other in any order. Administrative events, though, must occur in all traces in the same order. This reflects that SoDA terms do not constrain the order of executed tasks but that the user assignment relation must be consistent across all subterms at any time. We formalize this relation by the synchronized interleaving predicate si. For traces i, i 1 , and i 2 , si(i, i 1 , i 2 ) holds if and only if i 1 and i 2 "partition" i such that each administrative event in i is contained in both i 1 and i 2 , and each execution event is either in i 1 or i 2 . More precisely, we have the following.
* be traces. The synchronized interleaving predicate si(i, i 1 , i 2 ) is defined as
where a ranges over A, x over X , and i , i 1 , and i 2 over (X ∪ A) * .
Note that the Boolean or in the third case arises as there are two possible interleavings. The predicate si will hold (evaluate to true) if either of the two interleavings hold. We illustrate si with an example.
For these three traces, si(i, i 1 , i 2 ) holds. We now define the satisfaction of SoDA terms by traces.
Definition 4.9. Let u ∈ U be a user, t ∈ T a task, x ∈ X an execution event, and a ∈ A an administrative event. For a trace i ∈ (X ∪ A) * , a user assignment relation UA, a term φ, and a unit term φ ut , trace satisfiability is the smallest ternary relation between traces, user assignment relations, and terms, written i |= T UA φ, closed under the rules
We say that i satisfies φ with respect to UA, if i |= T UA φ. SODA T fulfills the requirements of Section 4.3: (R1) follows from rules (2)-(4), (R2) from rule (1), and (R3) from the rules corresponding to the respective operators. That SODA M agrees with SODA T in the absence of administrative events is shown by the following lemma, which we prove in Basin et al. [2011c] .
LEMMA 4.10. For all terms φ, all user assignment relations UA, and all traces i
Consider again the trace i and the term φ from Example 4.7. It is straightforward to see that i satisfies φ with respect to UA = ∅. Hence, SODA T overcomes the limitations of SODA M illustrated in Example 4.7. Summarizing, we first generalized SODA S to SODA M and thereby solved the problem that SODA S does not specify how many tasks each user who contributes to the satisfaction of a term must execute. Second, we introduced administrative events that may change user assignment relations, defined requirements that an SoDA enforcement incorporating these events must satisfy, and showed that SODA M does not capture them. Third, we further generalized SODA M to SODA T and showed that SODA T satisfies our requirements. Next, we define a mapping from terms to processes, which model enforcement monitors, and prove its correctness with respect to SODA T .
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Mapping Terms to Processes
We first introduce the auxiliary process END that engages in an arbitrary number of administrative events before it successfully terminates.
END = (a : A → END) SKIP
Using END, we define the mapping . U UA . Definition 4.11. Given a set of users U , a user assignment relation UA, and a term φ, the mapping φ U UA returns a process parametrized by UA. For a unit term φ ut and terms φ and ψ, the mapping . U UA is defined as follows.
Note that Eqs.
(1) and (2) require determining whether {{u }} |= M UA φ ut . This problem is analogous to testing whether a propositional formula is satisfiable under a given assignment and is also decidable in polynomial time.
Definition 4.12. For a term φ and a user assignment relation UA, the SoD enforcement process SOD φ (UA) is the process φ U UA . Before we show how an SoD enforcement process is used together with workflow processes and the RBAC process, we define correctness for the mapping . (1) if SOD φ accepts a workflow trace that corresponds to a successfully terminated workflow instance, then its prefix excluding satisfies φ under SODA T , and (2) if a workflow trace satisfies φ under SODA T , then its extension by corresponds to a successfully terminated workflow instance and is accepted by SOD φ . We prove Theorem 4.14 in Appendix A.2. THEOREM 4.14. The mapping . U UA is correct. Hence, if the SoD enforcement process accepts a successfully terminated workflow instance, then the corresponding SoD constraint is satisfied. We also know that no compliant workflow instance is falsely blocked by the SoD enforcement process. The following corollary relates the set of traces of SoD enforcement processes without administrative events and their corresponding multisets of users under the multiset semantics. Its proof follows directly from Theorem 4.14 and Lemma 4.10.
COROLLARY 4.15. For all terms φ, all user assignment relations UA, and all traces
Given a workflow process W and a term φ that models an SoD policy, the SoD-secure (workflow) process SSP W,φ is the parallel, partially synchronized composition of W, the RBAC process, and the SoD enforcement process SOD φ , parametrized by a user assignment relation UA and a permission assignment relation PA. φ. In other words, i 3 models a workflow instance that satisfies the drug dispensation workflow's SoD policy. Furthermore, by engaging in the first administrative event in i 3 , the user assignment relation changes to UA 2 and after engaging in the second administrative event it becomes UA 3 . Thereby, every task execution is authorized and RBAC(UA 1 , PA) accepts i 3 as well. Finally, it is easy to see that i 3 X ∈ T(W), that is, i 3 is also a workflow trace of W. As a result, i 3 ∈ T(SSP φ (UA 1 , PA) ).
This example illustrates how the three kinds of processes presented in this article interact and how each of them enforces its corresponding specification: W formalizes the workflow model, RBAC formalizes a possibly changing access control policy, and SOD φ (UA) formalizes the SoD policy, while accounting for changing role assignments. We have now completed our formal models and are ready to map them to a software implementation in the next section. We return to the case study in Section 5.5, when we measure the performance of our implementation.
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe an implementation of SoD as a Service. Our goal is to demonstrate the flexibility of this approach, to analyze its scalability, and to identify performance-critical parameters. We use the SoD-secure process as a blueprint for our implementation. Its subprocesses naturally map to components of a SOA as illustrated in Figure 3 . The components' interfaces can be inferred from the sets of events on which the respective processes synchronize and the processes themselves describe the components' behavior. We proceed by implementing W by a workflow engine, RBAC by a user repository, and SOD φ by a program called an SoD enforcement monitor. Workflow engines and user repositories are well-established concepts and we therefore realize them using off-the-shelf components. The stand-alone SoD enforcement monitor, however, is something new, which we therefore implemented from scratch. In Figure 3 and further illustrations we use dark gray to identify newly developed components.
Technical Objectives
We aim at realizing an effective, practical, and efficient implementation of SoD as a Service. By effective we mean that the implementation fulfills its purpose. Namely, it should support the execution of arbitrary workflows, facilitate changing RBAC configurations, and correctly enforce SoD constraints that are specified as SoDA terms.
We understand practicability in the sense that the integration and configuration effort is moderate. The main components of our system should be loosely coupled in order to enable a separation of concerns and to allow the integration of preexisting components, such as a legacy workflow system. Furthermore, the system should be configurable using standard means, for example, a workflow definition, an RBAC configuration, and an SoD policy, rather than requiring additional, labor-intensive settings.
The performance of our implementation is critical to the success of our approach. We call the runtime of a system with a workflow engine and a user repository, but without an SoD enforcement monitor, the runtime baseline. Our objective is to enforce SoD constraints efficiently, that is with a low overhead compared to the runtime baseline.
Architecture
As defined in Section 4.5, an SoD-secure process is the parallel, partially synchronized execution of three subprocesses, each responsible for a specific task. Due to the associativity of CSP's synchronous parallel composition operator ( || ), these three processes can be grouped in any order. Furthermore, the set of events on which these processes synchronize defines the kinds of events each process engages in. Therefore, any subset of these three processes can be mapped to an enforcement monitor and the set of events synchronized with the remaining processes specifies the monitor's interface. This is of particular interest if a system already provides one of the components we model by our processes. For example, assume a system comes with a workflow engine and an access control enforcement monitor. In this case, it is sufficient to generate an enforcement monitor for the SoD enforcement process and to synchronize all execution and administrative events with the existing components. Figure 3 shows our general approach of mapping W, RBAC, and SOD φ to individual system components. The concrete software tools we use and their intercommunication are illustrated in Figure 4 . Ignore the arrows and labels for the moment. Along with the various Web service standards, many semiformal business process modeling languages have emerged. Backed by numerous software vendors, the Web Service Business Process Execution Language (WS-BPEL) [Alves et al. 2007 ], or BPEL for short, is a popular standard for describing business processes at implementation level. A BPEL process definition can be directly executed by a workflow engine. At design time, we define a workflow in BPEL, possibly generated from a BPMN model, and deploy it to WPS. We use the BPEL extension BPEL4People [Agrawal et al. 2007 ] to specify human tasks.
LDAP supports RBAC with the object class accessRole. Instances of this class represent a role and store the distinguished name of their members, typically instances of inetOrgPerson, in the field member. We encode U, R, and UA in LDAP's export format LDIF and send it to TDS, or we administer them directly through TDS' Web interface.
Using an ASCII version of the SoDA grammar, we encode SoDA terms as character strings. We send them to the SoD enforcement monitor with a stand-alone client.
By adopting a service-oriented architecture, we achieve a loose coupling between our three main system components. This allows us to integrate two off-the-shelf components and our newly developed SoD enforcement monitor. Hence, we achieve the flexibility described in Section 5.1.
The downside of a SOA approach is the increased communication and serialization overhead. To determine whether a user is authorized to execute a task instance with respect to an SoD constraint, the SoD enforcement monitor requires context information, which must be sent across the network. The performance analysis in Section 5.5 shows that the respective communication overhead is acceptable. Similar trade-offs between flexible, distributed architectures with an increased communication overhead versus monolithic architectures with a smaller communication overhead have been made in the past. For example, the Hierarchical Resource Profile for XACML [Anderson 2005] proposes sending the hierarchy, based on which an access control decision is made, to the access control monitor along with each access request. As with our architecture, the access control monitor needs considerable context information to make an access decision.
Enforcement
An SoD-secure process SSP W,φ engages in three kinds of events: execution events, administrative events, and the event . The implementation and handling of administrative events and the event is straightforward. We take therefore a closer look at execution events and explain why every task instance in our system corresponds to an execution event that is accepted by SSP W,φ . An execution event corresponds to a sequence of steps in our implementation.
Consider the SoD-secure workflow process
for a SoDA term φ, an RBAC configuration (UA, PA), and a workflow process W that models a workflow w. Assume that i ∈ T(SSP W,φ (UA, PA)) corresponds to an unfinished workflow instance of w. Let UA be the user assignment relation after executing the administrative events in i. Assume that t is the next task of w that is executed in the workflow instance corresponding to i. We now look at the steps that our architecture performs, which will finally constitute an execution event x = t.u, for a user u. We refer to an arrow labeled with n in Figure 4 as An.
(1) Instantiation. The creation of x is triggered by the termination of the preceding task instance, that is, the rightmost execution event in i, or by the creation of i itself. (2) RBAC Authorization. In SSP W,φ , authorization decisions are made by the RBAC and the SOD φ process and W simply defines the order in which tasks must be executed. This is handled differently in most commercial workflow systems, including ours. For example, BPEL4People requires the definition of a query, called a people link, for every task. When the workflow engine instantiates the task, it executes the respective query against the user repository. The returned users are candidates for executing the newly created task instance. For a user u, the process RBAC(UA , PA) accepts the execution event t.u if u is assigned to one of the roles in R t = {r | (r, t) ∈ PA} according to UA . Therefore, during design time, we specify t's people link in such a way that the user repository returns all users who are assigned to a role in R t . In other words, the user repository keeps track of the user assignment relation UAand the workflow definition specifies the permission assignment relation PA. Implicitly, we assume a one-to-one relation between permissions and tasks.
WPS evaluates t's people link after every instantiation of t. Initially, the people link is sent to TDS (A1). Afterwards, TDS returns the set of users U 1 = {u | ∃r ∈ R t . (u, r) ∈ UA } to WPS (A2). (3) Refinement to SoD-compliant Users. Next, we select those users from U 1 who are allowed to execute x with respect to φ and i. Namely, we compute the set of users
WPS provides a plug-in interface that allows one to postprocess the sets of users returned by a user repository. We wrote a plug-in for this interface that sends U 1 , their assignments to roles UA 1 = {(u, r) ∈ UA | u ∈ U 1 }, and the identifiers of w and i to the SoD enforcement monitor (A3). We refer to this Web service call as a refinement call. For every workflow, the SoD enforcement monitor stores the corresponding SoDA term. Furthermore, it keeps track of the users who execute task instances (see step Claim). Together with the aforementioned inputs, the SoD enforcement monitor therefore has all the necessary parameters to compute U 2 , which it then returns to WPS (A4). (4) Display. A user can interact with WPS through a personalized Web interface. Once a user has successfully logged into the system, WPS displays a list of task instances that the user is authorized to execute. We call this list the user's inbox. For every user u ∈ U 2 , iˆ t.u ∈ T(SSP W,φ (UA, PA)). Therefore, WPS displays x in the inbox of every user in U 2 . (5) Claim. In workflow terminology, if a user requests to execute a task, he is said to claim the task. One of the users in U 2 must claim x by clicking on x in his inbox. Assume that the user u claims x, that is, in CSP x corresponds to the execution event t.u. Instantaneously, x is removed from the inboxes of all other users. At this point, we must communicate to the SoD enforcement monitor that u is executing x. In addition, we send the roles assigned to u to the monitor (A5). We refer to this Web service call as a claim call. (6) Termination. Afterwards, u is prompted with a form whose completion constitutes the work associated with x. The work is completed when the form is submitted. If x is not a task instance that terminates the workflow instance, its termination triggers the instantiation of at least one other task.
Summarizing, our system effectively enforces abstract SoD constraints as specified in Section 5.1. Arbitrary workflows, constrained by a possibly changing RBAC configuration and an abstract SoD policy, can be executed on WPS.
The practicability of our approach is supported by performance measurements for our case study in Section 5.5. However, we first examine its runtime complexity.
Complexity
When analyzing the runtime complexity of our SoD enforcement monitor implementation, it suffices to consider the complexity of refinement calls. The complexity of claim calls is negligible compared to refinement calls and is therefore not discussed.
In general, the problem of deciding whether a term is satisfied by a set of users is NPcomplete [Li and Wang 2008] . The SoD enforcement monitor must solve this decision problem for every user received through a refinement call. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that our refinement calls have a worst-case exponential runtime complexity. However, we show that the exponent remains small for moderate-size workflows.
The parameters of a refinement call are a set of users, U 1 , their role assignments, UA 1 , and the identifiers of i and w. Using the identifier of w, the monitor retrieves φ. With the identifier of i, it retrieves all the users who have executed task instances in i and their role assignments at that time.
For each u ∈ U 1 , the SoD enforcement monitor computes whether iˆ t.u ∈ T(SOD φ (UA 1 )). This computation is executed |U 1 | = n times. Consider the . -mapping. The evaluation of a unit term can be performed in time polynomial in the size of |U | and |R|; that is, p(|U|, |R|) for a polynomial p. In the worst case, SOD φ (UA 1 ) branches 2 |U | times per operator in φ. If m is the number of operators, the worst-case runtime is therefore in O(nm2 |U| p(|U|, |R|)). The exponential factor originates from the ⊗-operator, which causes SOD φ (UA 1 ) to branch for all disjoint subsets of U. Let U i+u = userset(users(i)) ∪ {u}, that is, the set of users in execution events in i and u. If we check whether iˆ t.u ∈ T(SOD φ (UA 1 )), the users in U \ U i+u are not relevant. We therefore need not branch over all partitions of U but only over those of U i+u . If φ does not contain a + -operator, then the maximal number of users in execution events in i is m+ 1 and therefore |U i+u | ≤ m+ 2. If φ does contain a + -operator, then |U i+u | ≤ |U|. Our implementation exploits these observations. Hence, its runtime complexity is in O(nm2
Our experience with business process catalogs, such as the IBM Insurance Application Architecture (IAA) [2011a] , is that workflows contain a good dozen human tasks on the average. Furthermore, most workflow languages allow the decomposition of workflows into subworkflows. Hence, we conclude that the performance penalty imposed by our SoD as a Service implementation remains acceptable for most workflows. We provide performance measurements that support this in the following section.
Performance Measurements
We return to the drug dispensation workflow introduced in Section 3.3, the term φ from Example 4.3, and the trace i 3 = t 1 .Dave, t 2 .Emma, add.Fritz.PrivacyAdvocate, t 3 .Fritz, t 5 .Bob, add.Alice.Pharmacist, t 7 .Alice, t 9 .Gerda, t 10 .Gerda, from Example 4.16. We modeled the workflow in BPEL, extended by BPEL4People, and deployed it on WPS. We set up the initial user assignment relation UA 1 using TDS' Web interface and deployed φ, encoded as string, to the SoD enforcement monitor. Furthermore, we configured WPS to use our plug-in to post process the sets of users returned when evaluating people links. We then executed instances of the drug dispensation workflow. For example, we logged into WPS as Dave and started a workflow instance by submitting a form that corresponds to t 1 (Request Drugs). Next, we logged into the system as Emma, claimed the newly created instance of the task t 2 (Retrieve Patient Record), and executed it by filling in the corresponding form. Using TDS' Web interface we then assigned Fritz to the role PrivacyAdvocate. Thereby, UA 1 evolved to UA 2 . We then executed t 3 (Check Anonymization Requirements) as Fritz. This sequence of activities corresponds to a prefix of i 3 . In the following, we report on the average performance of ten executions of workflow instances corresponding to i 3 .
Compared to the runtime baseline, the runtime of our prototype system is increased by a refinement and a claim call for every task instance. We call the time it takes to call a Web service and to retrieve its return values the total runtime of a Web service, which we decompose into two parts: the communication time encompasses the time to serialize, transmit, and deserialize the exchanged data and the computation time is the time to execute the service's functionality. Figure 5 illustrates the averaged communication and computation times in milliseconds (ms) for the ith task instance, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 7}.
The communication time depends on factors including the network throughput, latency, the payload size, and also the time taken to serialize Java objects to SOAP message parameters using the Apache Axis framework. We run the service client and the SoD enforcement monitor on two different computers at the same geographical The computation time for claim calls was always around 24ms. The computation time for refinement calls, however, increased with the number of executed task instances. As shown in Section 5.4, the operators in φ cause this time to increase exponentially.
Finally, we compare the total runtime of these additional calls to the time it takes to execute a task instance in a system without an SoD enforcement monitor. The refinement call increases the time between the termination of a preceding task instance and the moment the new task instance is ready to be claimed by a user. The durations for these steps range between 2 and 15 seconds, depending on the load on WPS and the latest patches installed on it. Claiming a new task instance takes only 1-3 seconds. A user clicks on the instance in his inbox and the corresponding form is displayed on his screen. In both cases, the additional runtime resulting from SoD enforcement monitor calls is an order of magnitude smaller than the runtime baseline, which varied between 2 and 5 seconds.
Given the observations made in the previous section and the times reported here, we conclude that the integration of our SoD as a Service implementation into an existing workflow system imposes a performance penalty below 10%. Consequently, we achieved all the objectives described in Section 5.1.
EVALUATION AND FUTURE WORK
Limitations of an Automated Mapping
As elaborated earlier, the abstract nature of SoDA has valuable advantages. However, it also poses challenges when mapping terms onto workflows. In particular, Li and Wang's [2008] set-based semantics SODA S does not specify a mapping between subterms and tasks. We use the workflows in Figure 6 to evaluate our generalization of SODA S to SODA T , our automated mapping to processes, their shortcomings, and explore directions for future work.
Consider the medical workflow shown in Figure 6 (a) and assume that we want to enforce the SoD constraint Nurse ⊗ Doctor, which does not specify whether the Doctor performs the surgery and the Nurse prepares the instruments or vice versa. We resolve this ambiguity by incorporating an RBAC configuration into the SoD-secure process. For this medical workflow, the depicted permission assignment relation rules out workflow instances where the Nurse performs the surgery and the Doctor prepares the instruments. However, incorporating an RBAC configuration does not solve all refinement questions related to the mapping from terms to processes. In particular when duties are to be separated between tasks assigned to the same users, an RBAC configuration is of little help. Consider the payment workflow in Figure 6 (b), ignoring the gray parts for the moment, and the term Accountant ⊗ Accountant + . Implicitly, we would assume that a separation of duties between the tasks prepare and approve is intended. However, a trace that corresponds to a workflow instance where one Accountant executes prepare and approve and another Accountant executes issue is also accepted by the SoD-secure process. A semiautomated approach where subterms are manually mapped to tasks would solve this problem. We have considered only fully automated mappings in this article and leave semiautomated solutions to future work.
An inherent weakness of SoDA that is revealed by an automated mapping is its poor support for loops. Consider the payment workflow in Figure 6 (b), now also including the gray elements, that is, looping over the tasks prepare and approve until the payment is approved. SoDA provides no means to specify an SoD constraint for each loop iteration. For example, we cannot specify that each pair of instances of prepare and approve must be executed by different users. Only terms containing a + -operator map to SoD enforcement processes that accept an arbitrary number of execution events. By SoDA's syntax S, however, the + -operator only ranges over unit terms. Li and Wang [2008] motivate this design decision with the "psychological acceptability principle" postulated by Saltzer and Schroeder [1975] . As a consequence, our approach supports only finitely many SoD constraints, that is, ⊗-operators, per term and therefore does not support loops in their full generality. Decomposing workflows into sub-workflows that do not contain loops is a possible solution to overcome this limitation. However, it is not fully automated either and also remains as future work. Our recently introduced concept of release [Basin et al. 2011b ] supports the scoping of authorization constraints and is therefore a candidate solution for manually decomposing workflows and refining the subterm-task mapping.
Continuous Satisfiability
The original semantics for SoDA, SODA S , as well as our generalizations SODA M and SODA T provide a binary decision as to whether a set, multiset, or trace, respectively, satisfies a given term. For example, consider a term φ and a trace i. SODA T tells us whether i satisfies φ but it makes no statement about whether there exists a trace i such that iˆi satisfies φ. In other words, SoDA's notion of satisfaction does not mean "we can still fulfill all constraints" but rather "all constraints have been fulfilled". As a consequence, a workflow trace corresponding to a workflow instance that has just been started typically does not satisfy φ. Only when engaging in the final event is φ supposed to be satisfied. This is also reflected in Theorem 4.14, which makes only statements about successfully terminated workflow instances and not about their prefixes.
Developing an enforcement monitor that continuously ensures that every accepted prefix can be extended to a workflow trace that satisfies φ is therefore another direction for future work. Wang and Li made some initial contributions in this direction in [2007] . However, their solution is limited to a subset of SoDA terms and does not consider administrative activities that may change the underlying RBAC configuration during enforcement.
Unavailability of Users
Dropping the assumption that authorizations do not change during workflow execution leads to the question of what to do when users become unavailable. Clearly, when no user is available, workflow instances cannot successfully terminate, resulting in business disruptions. We see two directions for future work that address this problem.
An obvious approach is to determine new assignments of users to roles, for example, corresponding to the employment of new users, that allow a successful termination. We formalize this problem in Basin et al. [2012] ; more specifically, we describe the problem of finding an optimal RBAC configuration that incurs minimal administrative cost and enables a successful workflow execution. The underlying authorization model, though, is not based on SoDA but on Basin et al. [2011b] .
Some real-world events that trigger administrative activities, such as accidents, cannot be planned and new assignments of users to roles may not be possible in time.
In such cases avoiding a business disruption may outweigh violating authorizations, leading to the idea of providing some sort of exception mechanism. Authorizations may, for example, be associated with compensating activities, which must be executed if the respective authorizations are violated. The work on break-glass authorization models [Marinovic et al. 2011] , which allow an override of default authorizations when certain conditions are met, is a promising direction of future work here.
Abstractions
For simplicity, our SoD enforcement monitor does not cope with the abort or suspension of task instances. In practice, however, WPS users can hand back unfinished task instances to the workflow engine or trigger the abortion of a workflow instance. Furthermore, we enforce exactly one term per workflow. This is not a limitation as two or more terms can be combined into a single term with the appropriate SoDA operators; for example, for a conjunction or for a disjunction. If no SoD constraint must be enforced, the term All + , which is satisfied by every nonempty multiset of users, can be used.
RELATED WORK
The ideas pursued in this article are in line with the notion of Model-driven Security (MDS) [Basin et al. 2006 ] that aims at synthesizing a system's implementation from the composition of abstract specifications of its business and security requirements. In particular, Basin et al. generate implementations of workflow systems that include access control requirements in [2003] . In contrast, we focus specifically on SoD constraints and our implementation integrates heterogeneous software components as opposed to automatically generating monolithic software applications.
Our concept of an SoD enforcement monitor can be seen as an instance of Schneider's security automata [2000] in that it is also composed with an insecure system and checks whether commands are authorized prior to their execution. To the best of our knowledge, Basin et al. [2007] were the first to use CSP to formalize security automata. Like them, we encode what is widely known as a Policy Decision Point (PDP) as a CSP process and synchronous process composition constitutes the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP).
There are numerous models and frameworks to formalize and enforce SoD constraints [Gligor et al. 1998; Simon and Zurko 1997] . Static SoD enforces SoD constraints at design time, for example, by ensuring that no user is assigned to two conflicting tasks. In contrast, dynamic SoD is enforced at runtime and is more flexible than static enforcement. Dynamic SoD is therefore more interesting for real-world settings although it is in general more complex than static SoD. Our work is the first to model dynamic enforcement of SoD constraints with changing role assignments.
Most SoD mechanisms describe and enforce constraints between two or more explicit tasks and are therefore tightly coupled with a workflow definition [Sandhu 1988; Bertino et al. 1999; Knorr and Stormer 2002] . In contrast, our approach allows a workflow-independent specification of SoD constraints and their enforcement on different workflows. This has the advantages presented in Section 1 but poses the challenges elaborated in Section 6.4.
In more detail, in his seminal paper [1988] Sandhu introduces transaction control expressions for specifying dynamic SoD constraints on data objects. Enforcement decisions are made at runtime, based on the history of executed tasks. A workflow, associated with a data object, is defined by a list of tasks, each with one or more attached roles. A user is authorized to execute a task if she acts in one of these roles. By default, all tasks must be executed by different users. Constraints are less expressive than SoDA terms and they can only be defined in combination with a concrete workflow. Bertino et al. [1999] check the consistency of constraints defined over workflows in a logical framework, often referred to as BFA model. Their constraints are defined with respect to sequences of tasks that model workflows, applying (first-order) predicates to task occurrences. Schaad et al. extend SoD analysis to workflows with dynamic access rights [2006] . They describe the workflow, the associated access control policy, and the delegation and revocation steps as transitions of a finite state automaton and apply model checking to verify the constraints expressed in linear temporal logic. However, neither of these papers provide a mapping to an enforcement mechanism. Knorr and Stormer [2002] map dynamic SoD constraints along with basic workflow models to Prolog clauses in order to compute all workflow instances that do not violate the specified SoD constraints. In Nash and Poland's object-based separation of duties [1990] , each data object keeps track of the users who have executed actions on it. If a user requests to execute an action on an object, this is only granted if he has not executed an action on this object before. This functionality can be modeled with our formalism if every data object is protected by an SoD-enforcement process.
There are many languages for modeling workflows. We used BPMN [OMG 2011 ] for visualizing the drug dispensation workflow and BPEL [Alves et al. 2007 ], including its human task extension BPEL4People [Agrawal et al. 2007] , to implement it in WPS. BPMN and BPEL are well-established whereas BPEL4People is only supported by a few workflow engines. The formalization of these modeling languages with a process calculus is commonplace, for example, Wong and Gibbons [2008] map BPMN to CSP and [Cámara et al. 2006 ] map BPEL to CCS. Thomas et al. [2007] and Paci et al. [2008] describe two different service-oriented architectures for enforcing SoD constraints. Similar to BPEL4People, both papers describe an extension to BPEL for augmenting workflow models with authorizations; the former proposes its own basic authorization language, whereas the latter builds on earlier work of Crampton [2005] . In contrast to their work, our approach requires no extension of BPEL. Being workflow language agnostic, we achieve a loose coupling between authorizations and workflow definitions.
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